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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Parvin has asserted that the district court erred when it denied his 
petition for post-conviction relief because the district court applied an incorrect legal 
standard in dismissing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) proceeding. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Parvin's claim fails because: 
(1) he failed to preserve it for appeal; (2) the district court did not apply an erroneous 
legal standard in denying his claim; (3) he failed to present any evidence that his 
counsel was ineffective in relation to the Rule 35 motion; and (4) he was not entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel in a Rule 35 proceeding. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-17.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to correct the State's misunderstanding of the facts 
and the law, as well as to clarify Mr. Parvin's arguments. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Parvin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
1. Is Mr. Parvin's claim preserved for appeal? 
2. Did the district court apply an incorrect legal standard when ruling on his claim 
that his attorney was ineffective in relation to his Rule 35 motion? 
3. Did Mr. Parvin present evidence that his attorney was ineffective in relation to his 
Rule 35 motion? 
4. Was Mr. Parvin entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his Rule 35 
proceeding? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mr. Parvin's Claim Is Preserved For Appeal 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Parvin's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion is not preserved for appeal, 
specifically: 
Parvin's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in relation to his Rule 35 
motion was never analyzed by the district court, a fact which Parvin 
recognizes on appeal. (See R., pp.145-61; Appellant's brief, p.8.) The 
district court's failure to put its analysis of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on the record has not been preserved for appeal. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The claim that the issue is not preserved for appeal is based 
on the State's citation to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b), which the State asserts 
prohibits a party from appealing from a decision based on a failure to make findings 
unless that party has moved for the court to make such findings and had that request 
denied. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
The State's argument relies on a basic misunderstanding of the facts of this case 
and of Mr. Parvin's Appellant's Brief. First, the State's assertion that Mr. Parvin has 
acknowledged that his claim "was never analyzed by the district court" is incorrect. The 
portion of the Appellant's Brief cited to by the State contains the following passage: 
In denying and dismissing Mr. Parvin's otherwise unanalyzed claims, 
including his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court 
explained: 
[T]he court finds that Parvin's remaining claims were claims 
that were addressed (even if not in the appellate decision) or 
should have been addressed on the direct appeal filed in the 
underlying criminal case. Having so found, this court cannot 
now revisit those issues as it is prevented from doing so both 
by Idaho Code 19-4901 (b) and relevant case authority. 
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(R., p.161.) 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8 (brackets in original) (emphasis added).) 
In developing its interpretation of Mr. Parvin's claim in his Appellant's Brief, the 
State has ignored the presence of the word "otherwise." The term otherwise, as used in 
Mr. Parvin's brief, modifies the term unanalyzed. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parvin 
was explaining that, other than the analysis to which he was about to cite, the district 
court did not analyze the claim. 1 
Additionally, the State's attempt to redraft Mr. Parvin's claim for appellate 
purposes, it betrays the State's complete misunderstanding of Mr. Parvin's claim. In his 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parvin claimed, "The district court erred when it held that Mr. 
Parvin was required to bring his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal 
because it relied on an incorrect understanding of the law." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
Nowhere in his Appellant's Brief did Mr. Parvin assert that the decision from which he 
was appealing was the failure of the district court to "put its analysis ... on the record." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) 
Mr. Parvin asserts that he did preserve the issue that he identified on appeal, and 
that the State's argument fails. 
1 The State again mischaracterized Mr. Parvin's argument in the concluding paragraph 
of the portion of its brief dealing with this issue, writing, "The district court expressed no 
grounds for dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as such, and even 
Parvin recognizes that this issue was not analyzed by the district court." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.12 (emphasis added).) For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Parvin disputes the 
State's characterization of his argument. 
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11. 
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard When Ruling On His Claim That 
His Attorney Was Ineffective In Relation To His Rule 35 Motion 
In an argument that it made within its preservation argument, discussed above, 
the State alternatively argues that Mr. Parvin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in relation to his Rule 35 motion fails because "it was not rejected for the reasons he 
states[.]" (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State's argument fails because it is 
contradicted by the record. 
In making its argument, the State makes much of the fact that the district court's 
written order denying post-conviction relief mentions several of Mr. Parvin's claims in 
one section without specifically mentioning his claim that counsel was ineffective in 
relation to his Rule 35 motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) With respect to 
Mr. Parvin's claim on appeal "that the district court erroneously dismissed his claim that 
his attorney was ineffective in pursuing his Rule 35 motion because Parvin failed to 
raise this claim on his prior appeal[,]" the State argued, "Review of the record, however, 
shows that it was a different claim, the denial of due process, which the district court 
dismissed on this basis." (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) 
The State's argument is fraught with several problems. First, it ignores the fact 
that the district court's recitation of some of Mr. Parvin's claims on which it stakes its 
claim appears in the section of the order entitled "Procedural History" (R., pp.145-51 
(capitalization altered)), and not in the section entitled "Law and Analysis[.]" 
(R., pp.151-61 (capitalization altered).) Second, the district court later summarized the 
claims related to the Rule 35 motion in the Law and Analysis section under the heading 
'The I.C.R. 35 Motion claims" (R., p.159 (emphasis added)), as follows: 
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The remaining claims asserted by Parvin deal with his Rule 35 motion filed 
in his criminal action and the actions of the respective players in the 
determination of that motion, specifically his court appointed public 
defender, [the] Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney, [and] the District 
Court represented by Judge Morfitt. Parvin claims that the actions of the 
above parties denied him the opportunity to have his /.C.R. 35 motion 
granted and the unified sentence of twenty (20) years imposed. 
(R., p.159 (emphases added).) 
The State has interpreted the italicized statement above to be the district court's 
having "characterized all claims relating to the Rule 35 motion as a deprivation of due 
process[.]" (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) Nothing in the above passage indicates that the 
district court is only discussing a due process claim. Several factors can result in the 
denial of an opportunity to have a Rule 35 motion granted, including the district court 
losing jurisdiction due to inaction or defense counsel's failure to ensure that the district 
court rules on a Rule 35 motion within the time required for it to maintain jurisdiction to 
do SO. 
Furthermore, the State's interpretation cannot be reconciled with a later portion of 
the district court's order, in which, after discussing the limitations that exist on post-
conviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal, the district court 
announced, 
The court notes that at the evidentiary hearing the Canyon County Public 
Defender conceded that he had no legal authority or argument as to 
whether this court had any authority or ability to reverse the Idaho Court of 
Appeal's [sic] decision in Parvin's appeal in the criminal matter. Rather, 
counsel's efforts were focused on Judge Morfitt's decision both in delaying 
his granting of the I.C.R 35 motion and the decision to vacate the order 
that amended Parvin's sentence. Parvin also criticizes the conduct of the 
Canyon County Public Defender and the Canyon County Prosecuting 
Attorney in their handling of the matter. 
However, as noted above, the issue presented to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals on appeal was the procedures taken with regard to Parvin's 
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I.C.R. 35 motion. In addition, the Court of Appeals['] decision was based 
on its interpretation of that rule and relevant case authority. This court 
cannot second guess the Court of Appeals['] approach in making the 
decision or the decision not to address Parvin's concerns on the merits. In 
addition, this court has not been presented with any legal authority to 
support Parvin's claims that this court has the ability to somehow undo or 
ignore the decision issued by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Thus, the court 
finds that Parvin's remaining claims were claims that were addressed 
(even if not in the appellate decision) or should have been addressed on 
the direct appeal filed in the underlying criminal case. Having so found, 
this court cannot now revisit those issues as it is prevented from doing so 
both by Idaho Code 19-4901 (b) and relevant case authority. 
It is clear for the record that Parvin's Canyon County cases which are the 
subject of this decision have involved some unfortunate procedural issues 
that may have been detrimental to Parvin. However, this court is bound 
by the law as it exists in this state and the court cannot provide Parvin with 
the relief he has requested. 
(R., pp.160-61 (emphases added).) 
The State's reading assumes that the district court's references to Mr. Parvin's 
criticism of his original attorney and the existence of "some unfortunate procedural 
issues that may have been detrimental" to his case are limited to a due process claim. 
The problem is that the above passage refers to "claims" not a claim and does not 
explicitly limit its findings or conclusions to those concerning due process. Additionally, 
the district court concluded its order with the following language: 
Therefore, it is the order and judgment of this court that the Plaintiff 
Michael Parvin's Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed in the 
above entitled action is hereby denied and dismissed for the reasons set 
forth above. 
(R., p.161 (emphasis added).) The State's interpretation of the district court's order 
ignores this clear indication that the district court was denying and dismissing 
Mr. Parvin's entire amended petition (and all of the claims therein) for the reasons set 
forth within its order. 
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Mr. Parvin asserts that he has established, in both his Appellant's Brief and in 
this Reply Brief, that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it denied 
and dismissed his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 
motion. 
111. 
Mr. Parvin Presented Evidence That His Attorney Was Ineffective In Relation To His 
Rule 35 Motion 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that, assuming that his claim was 
preserved for appeal, it fails because 
None of the evidence presented at the hearing supports Parvin's 
contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to 
his Rule 35 motion. Parvin did not put on any evidence that his counsel 
was objectively deficient. Parvin did not put on any evidence that his 
counsel's actions, as opposed to the district court's delay, in anyway [sic] 
prejudiced him. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.15.) A review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Parvin did 
present evidence in support of his claim. 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the district court took judicial notice of a 
packet of documents submitted by Mr. Parvin's post-conviction counsel. (Tr., p.6, L.25 
- p.7, L 18.) Those documents included Mr. Parvin's Verified Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, filed in his original post-conviction proceedings. (Request for 
Judicial Notice, pp.41-52.) That Verified Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
includes the following statement: 
Petitioner's attorney was deficient in failing to take action to ensure that 
the District Court took timely action on the clearly meritorious motion to 
reduce sentence. This failure resulted in a delay which, according to the 
Court of Appeals, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. Timely action 
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by Petitioner's attorney would have resulted in Petitioner's receiving the 
just sentence he is entitled to, five to twenty years. 
(Request for Judicial Notice, p.50.) The State presented no evidence to contradict or 
otherwise call into doubt the truth of this statement. ( See generally, Tr.) 
Under Idaho Code § 19-4907, documents that are admitted at the request of the 
parties in post-conviction proceedings, including verified petitions and documents which 
might otherwise be considered inadmissible hearsay, are evidence in such proceedings. 
See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936 (Ct. App. 2005). As such, the evidence in 
support of Mr. Parvin's claim included the above-quoted portion of his Verified Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Because Mr. Parvin submitted uncontradicted evidence that, but for his attorney's 
failure to ensure that the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion in a timely manner, it 
would have retained jurisdiction to grant it (which it had done, but only after losing 
jurisdiction), the State's claim that he presented no evidence to support this claim is 
without merit. 
IV. 
Mr. Parvin Was Entitled To Effective Assistance Of Counsel In His Rule 35 Proceeding 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that because a Rule 35 proceeding is 
not a "critical stage" Mr. Parvin was not entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 
and, as a result, he could not have been deprived of the effective assistance of such 
counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17 .) 
The State's argument fails because it fails to acknowledge that Mr. Parvin had 
statutorily-appointed counsel during his Rule 35 proceeding, and, as such, had a 
9 
statutory right to the effective assistance of that counsel, notwithstanding cases 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment's strictures. 
Idaho Code§ 19-852, in relevant part, provides: 
(a) A needy person ... who is under formal charge of having committed, or 
is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled: 
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person 
having his own counsel is so entitled[.] 
(b) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under 
subsection (a) is entitled: 
(1) to be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter beginning 
with the earliest time when a person providing his own counsel would be 
entitled to be represented by an attorney and including revocation of 
probation; 
(2) to be represented in any appeal; 
(3) to be represented in any other post-conviction or post-commitment 
proceeding that the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate, 
unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is 
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be 
willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a frivolous proceeding. 
Id. (emphases added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted Idaho Code§ 19-852 as guaranteeing 
a right to the effective assistance of counsel, finding that it "would be a hollow right" if it 
did not provide such a guarantee. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995). In 
assessing whether the statutory right has been violated, courts are to use the standards 
employed in "determining whether there has been a violation of a similar constitutional 
right." Id. 
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The State's argument Mr. Parvin was not entitled to the effective assistance of 
counsel because he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a Rule 35 proceeding 
fails because he had a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel as 
recognized in this Court's decision in Hernandez. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parvin 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to his Rule 35 motion, and remand this 
matter to the district court for consideration of his claim on the merits. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2011. 
,,:/'°'- "~ 
( /~·~"", 
;>( 
SPENCER J. HAHN 
IDepu~ State Appellate Public Defender 
' .f' 
'"~<," 
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